Going passwordless with Microsoft Entra ID
The working reference for designing, deploying and operating phishing-resistant, passwordless sign-in across a Microsoft Entra ID workforce tenant: passkeys and FIDO2 security keys, Windows Hello for Business, passkey profiles, Conditional Access authentication strengths, rollout, recovery and troubleshooting.
No sections match that search. Try a method name (e.g. “FIDO2”), a term (“AAGUID”) or a date (“2027”).
Passwordless authentication replaces the password as the primary credential with something the user has (a device-bound or synced private key) unlocked by something they are or know locally (biometric or PIN). The secret never leaves the authenticator and is never typed into a web page, so there is nothing for an attacker to phish or replay.
These two terms are often confused:
- Passwordless: no password is entered at sign-in. Microsoft Authenticator phone sign-in is passwordless, but a user can still be tricked into approving a sign-in on an attacker’s proxy page.
- Phishing-resistant: the credential is cryptographically bound to the legitimate origin (
login.microsoftonline.com), so an adversary-in-the-middle page cannot obtain a usable assertion. Passkeys (FIDO2), Windows Hello for Business, Platform SSO on macOS and certificate-based authentication qualify.
The target state is phishing-resistant passwordless: every user has at least two phishing-resistant credentials, Conditional Access requires them by authentication strength, and the password is no longer used in daily sign-in.
Microsoft now designs Entra on the assumption that users sign in without passwords. System-preferred authentication now applies to first-factor sign-in, so users with a passkey or certificate registered no longer see a password prompt at all. Tenants without a plan will get these changes on Microsoft’s schedule.
Dates are for the worldwide/GCC cloud unless noted. The next upcoming milestone is highlighted automatically based on today’s date.
- Mar 2026Passkey profiles and synced passkeys GA
Group-targeted FIDO2 configuration with a
passkeyTypeof device-bound, synced or both. Existing FIDO2 settings migrate into a “Default passkey profile” (worldwide migration May to June 2026; GCC High/DoD October 2026). - May 2026Profile limits raised; account recovery GA
Up to 10 passkey profiles per tenant with a dedicated 20 KB policy allocation. Entra ID account recovery (government ID + biometric verification via partners) became generally available.
- Late May 2026Entra passkeys on Windows and External ID passkeys GA
Device-bound passkeys in the Windows Hello container for unmanaged, personal and shared PCs. Passkeys for Entra External ID (customer) tenants also reached GA.
- 30 Jun 2026System-preferred authentication for first factor
Strongest registered method is offered first at primary sign-in. Order: TAP, passkey, CBA, Authenticator, external MFA, TOTP, telephony, QR code, password.
- 1 Sep 2026Passkeys by default
Users enabled for SMS/voice are auto-enabled for passkeys (all types allowed) and nudged by a registration campaign with unlimited snoozes. Opt-out of auto-enablement via Graph is available until 1 Feb 2027.
- 30 Oct 2026Customer-managed telecom providers
Organizations that must keep SMS/voice can contract a carrier through the Microsoft Security Store and bear the cost directly. Entra passkeys on Windows reach GCC High/DoD during October.
- Jan 2027Security questions removed from SSPR
Security questions are phased out as a self-service password reset method.
- 1 Feb 2027Microsoft SMS/voice retired for users
Applies to all users except Global Administrators and external users. Users whose only MFA method is SMS/voice get a blocking prompt to register a passkey.
- 1 Jul 2027Microsoft SMS/voice retired for Global Admins & external users
After this date only customer-managed telecom can deliver SMS/voice codes.
Government cloud dates
| Feature | Worldwide / GCC | GCC High / DoD | USNat / USSec |
|---|---|---|---|
| Passkey profiles GA | March 2026 | May 2026 | October 2026 |
| Default profile migration | May to June 2026 | October 2026 | October 2026 |
| Entra passkeys on Windows GA | Late April to mid-June 2026 | October 2026 | Not announced |
If a tenant still has users whose only MFA method is SMS or voice, those users will be forced through passkey registration at their next sign-in after 1 Feb 2027. Run Microsoft’s SMS/voice usage analyzer now and schedule the migration yourself.
Entra supports several passwordless credentials. They differ in where the key lives, whether they can sign in to the device itself, whether the authenticator can prove its make and model (attestation), and what they cost to issue. Filter the table to the properties you need.
| Method | Phishing-resistant | Key storage | Device sign-in | Attestation | Unmanaged devices | Best fit |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Windows Hello for BusinessCloud Kerberos Trust / key / cert trust | Yes | TPM on the PC | Yes | TPM-backed | No | Managed Windows, primary sign-in |
| Platform SSO (macOS)Secure Enclave key | Yes | Secure Enclave | Yes | No | No | Managed Macs |
| Entra passkey on WindowsGA May 2026 | Yes | Windows Hello container | No | No | Yes | Personal, shared or unjoined PCs |
| FIDO2 security keyUSB / NFC / BLE | Yes | Hardware key | YesEntra / hybrid joined | Yes | Yes | Admins, shared devices, high assurance |
| Passkey in Microsoft Authenticator | Yes | Phone secure hardware | No | Yes | Yes | Roaming credential, BYOD, backup |
| Synced passkeyiCloud Keychain, Google Password Manager, third-party managers | Yes | Provider cloud, synced | No | No | Yes | Broad workforce, contractors, easy recovery |
| Certificate-based authSmart card / PIV / CAC, multifactor binding | Yes | Smart card or device cert | Yes | PKI-issued | Yes | Federal and regulated, existing PKI |
| Authenticator phone sign-inNumber match push | No | Phone | No | No | Yes | Transitional only |
| QR code + PINFrontline, shared mobile | No | N/A | No | No | Shared mobile | Frontline where keys aren’t practical |
Method notes
Windows Hello for Business
The default for managed Windows. A TPM-protected key pair per user per device, unlocked by face, fingerprint or PIN. Issues the Primary Refresh Token at Windows sign-in, so browser and app SSO follow.
- Hybrid
- Cloud Kerberos Trust (no PKI)
- Cloud-only
- No trust model needed
- Limits
- One device; needs a roaming credential too
Entra passkey on Windows
Stores a device-bound Entra passkey in the Windows Hello container on PCs that aren’t joined or registered. Used for web and app sign-in; not for signing in to Windows itself.
- Register
- Per account, per device
- Block it
- Add Windows Hello AAGUIDs to a profile block list
FIDO2 security keys
Portable hardware authenticators. The strongest option for privileged roles and shared workstations. Use attestation plus an AAGUID allow list to restrict to approved models, and buy FIPS-validated keys where policy demands.
- Cost
- Hardware + logistics
- Plan for
- Two keys per admin; loss process
Passkey in Authenticator
Device-bound passkey held in Microsoft Authenticator (iOS/Android). Signs in on the phone directly, or on another device via QR + Bluetooth proximity (hybrid transport). A good second credential for Windows Hello users.
- Needs
- Bluetooth for cross-device
- Registers via
- My Security Info or campaign
Synced passkeys
Passkeys stored and synced by a platform or third-party credential manager. Easy to use and recover, but you are relying on the security of the provider account. Cannot be attested, so enforcing attestation in a profile excludes them.
- Assurance
- Suits NIST AAL2 use; use device-bound for AAL3
Certificate-based authentication
Native Entra CBA with X.509 certificates on smart cards (PIV/CAC) or devices. Configure the binding as multifactor for it to count as phishing-resistant. Removes the need for AD FS in many federal environments.
- Needs
- CA trust + CRL publication in Entra
Passkey (FIDO2 / WebAuthn) sign-in
At registration the authenticator generates a key pair scoped to the relying party ID. Entra stores only the public key and, when available, the authenticator’s AAGUID and attestation. At sign-in Entra sends a challenge; the browser passes it to the authenticator only if the page origin matches the relying party. This origin check is what stops phishing proxies.
Windows Hello for Business: Cloud Kerberos Trust
For hybrid-joined and Entra-joined devices that still need on-premises Kerberos (file shares, legacy apps), Cloud Kerberos Trust is the recommended model. It needs no PKI and no certificate deployment to clients. Entra ID issues a partial Kerberos TGT from a read-only-DC-style AzureADKerberos object in AD; a writable domain controller exchanges it for a full TGT.
Most passwordless controls sit in Entra ID P1, which Microsoft 365 E3, E5 and Business Premium already include. The table follows Microsoft’s MFA licensing page; confirm against your agreement before quoting it to a customer.
| Capability | Licence | Notes |
|---|---|---|
| Security defaults | Free | Baseline MFA with Authenticator. No authentication strengths or targeting. |
| Microsoft Authenticator | Free | Push, number matching and passkeys in the app. |
| Passkeys (FIDO2), WHfB, hardware tokens | P1 | Listed under P1 on the MFA licensing page. The passkeys-by-default change reaches every tenant with SMS/voice users. |
| Conditional Access and authentication strengths | P1 | Required to enforce phishing-resistant sign-in. |
| Token protection | P1 | A Conditional Access session control. |
| Risk-based Conditional Access | P2 | Identity Protection user and sign-in risk policies. |
| Privileged Identity Management | P2 or Entra ID Governance | Just-in-time role activation with authentication context. |
| Identity verification for account recovery | Partner cost | Verification partners (and Verified ID Face Check) are billed separately. |
| Customer-managed SMS/voice | Carrier cost | Contracted through the Microsoft Security Store from 30 Oct 2026. |
Everything below lives under Entra admin center › Protection › Authentication methods unless noted. Manage methods only in the converged Authentication methods policy; the legacy MFA and SSPR method settings are retired.
Passkey profiles
A passkey profile is a named set of FIDO2 rules assigned to groups. Build profiles by persona rather than one tenant-wide rule.
| Setting | Options | Guidance |
|---|---|---|
| Passkey type | Device-bound · Synced · Both | Device-bound only for privileged roles; both for general workforce. |
| Enforce attestation | On · Off | On restricts to device-bound authenticators that can prove their model. Synced passkeys and Entra passkeys on Windows cannot attest. |
| Key restrictions | Allow list · Block list (AAGUIDs) | Allow-list approved security key models and Authenticator for admins. Use a block list to exclude specific providers. |
| Target | Groups | Up to 10 profiles per tenant. Assign break-glass accounts to the privileged profile. |
Suggested profile set
| Profile | Target | Type | Attestation | Keys |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| PK-Privileged | Tier-0/1 admin accounts, break-glass | Device-bound | On | Allow: approved FIDO2 models |
| PK-Workforce | All employees | Both | Off | Open, or block-list unapproved providers |
| PK-Frontline | Shared-device workers | Device-bound | On | Allow: issued security keys |
| PK-External | Contractors in tenant | Both | Off | Open |
Well-known AAGUIDs
Verify against the current Microsoft documentation and vendor metadata before building an allow list.
| Authenticator | AAGUID |
|---|---|
| Microsoft Authenticator (iOS) | 90a3ccdf-635c-4729-a248-9b709135078f |
| Microsoft Authenticator (Android) | de1e552d-db1d-4423-a619-566b625cdc84 |
| macOS Platform SSO (Secure Enclave) | 7fd635b3-2ef9-4542-8d9d-164f2c771efc |
| Windows Hello | 08987058-cadc-4b81-b6e1-30de50dcbe969ddd1817-af5a-4672-a2b9-3e3dd95000a96028b017-b1d4-4c02-b4b3-afcdafc96bb2 |
Temporary Access Pass (TAP)
A time-limited passcode that satisfies strong authentication so a user can register passwordless credentials without ever knowing a password. Enable it for all users who will onboard passwordless, prefer one-time use, and keep lifetimes short (hours, not days).
# Scopes: UserAuthenticationMethod.ReadWrite.All Connect-MgGraph -Scopes "UserAuthenticationMethod.ReadWrite.All" New-MgUserAuthenticationTemporaryAccessPassMethod ` -UserId "new.hire@contoso.com" ` -BodyParameter @{ lifetimeInMinutes = 480; isUsableOnce = $true }
Registration campaign
Set the campaign to target passkey-enabled users and prompt for a passkey (Microsoft Authenticator is the alternative target). The 1 Sep 2026 change enabled a Microsoft-managed campaign with unlimited snoozes for SMS/voice users; set your own snooze limit once communications have gone out.
Opting out of automatic passkey enablement
Only if you need time to stand up a customer-managed telecom provider. The opt-out is valid until 1 Feb 2027 and does not move the retirement dates.
PATCH https://graph.microsoft.com/beta/policies/authenticationmethodspolicy Content-Type: application/json { "optOutSettings": { "passkeyDynamicMigration": true } }
Windows Hello for Business with Cloud Kerberos Trust
- Create the Entra Kerberos server object in each domain that has users signing in with WHfB.
- Deploy WHfB with Intune (Settings catalog › Windows Hello for Business): Use Windows Hello For Business = true, Use Cloud Trust For On Prem Auth = Enabled, TPM required.
- Confirm clients are Windows 10 21H2+ or Windows 11 with current cumulative updates.
Install-Module -Name AzureADHybridAuthenticationManagement -AllowClobber $domain = $env:USERDNSDOMAIN $cloudUpn = "hybrid.admin@contoso.com" # Hybrid Identity Administrator $domainCred = Get-Credential # Domain Admin in $domain Set-AzureADKerberosServer -Domain $domain -UserPrincipalName $cloudUpn -DomainCredential $domainCred Get-AzureADKerberosServer -Domain $domain -UserPrincipalName $cloudUpn -DomainCredential $domainCred
Rotate the AzureADKerberos key periodically (Set-AzureADKerberosServer -RotateServerKey) as you would krbtgt, and include the object in your AD tiering model: it is Tier 0.
Registered passkeys only improve security once Conditional Access requires them. Use authentication strengths as the grant control rather than “Require MFA”.
| Built-in strength | Includes | Use for |
|---|---|---|
| Multifactor authentication | Any MFA combination, including SMS and voice | Legacy baseline only |
| Passwordless MFA | Phishing-resistant methods + Authenticator phone sign-in | Transitional workforce policy |
| Phishing-resistant MFA | WHfB / platform credential, passkeys (FIDO2), CBA multifactor | Target state; mandatory for admins |
Create a custom strength when you need to require a specific authenticator, for example “passkey with AAGUID in the approved security key list” for Tier-0 roles.
Baseline policy set
| ID | Policy | Assignment | Grant |
|---|---|---|---|
CA-PWL-01 | Admins require phishing-resistant MFA | All directory roles · all resources | Custom strength: attested device-bound passkey |
CA-PWL-02 | Protect security info registration | All users · user action: register security information | Compliant device or TAP-inclusive strength |
CA-PWL-03 | Workforce phishing-resistant (pilot, then all) | Pilot group, then all users · all resources | Phishing-resistant MFA |
CA-PWL-04 | Sensitive apps require device-bound credential | Tier-1 apps (finance, HR, source control) | Custom strength excluding synced passkeys |
CA-PWL-05 | Block legacy authentication | All users · legacy clients | Block |
Keep two cloud-only emergency access accounts excluded from the CA-PWL policies, each with its own FIDO2 security keys stored in separate secure locations. Alert on every sign-in to them.
Windows Hello for Business is covered above. This section covers the other places users sign in.
macOS: Platform SSO
Platform SSO registers the Mac with Entra ID and gives the user a Secure Enclave key that signs them in to the Mac, issues the PRT for app SSO, and works as a passkey for WebAuthn prompts in the browser.
| Requirement | Value |
|---|---|
| macOS | 14 Sonoma or later recommended; 13 Ventura supported with a weaker experience |
| Apps | Company Portal 5.2404.0 or later (2504+ for the biometric policy) and Microsoft Authenticator |
| Management | Intune or another MDM delivering the Enterprise SSO extension profile |
| Authentication method | Secure Enclave key (passwordless, phishing-resistant). Avoid the password sync method; it is neither. |
| Stronger option | UserSecureEnclaveKeyBiometricPolicy (macOS 14.6+) requires Touch ID every time the key is used, with no password fallback |
| AAGUID | 7FD635B3-2EF9-4542-8D9D-164F2C771EFC (add to allow lists that should accept the Mac platform credential) |
iOS and Android
- Broker: Microsoft Authenticator (iOS, with the Enterprise SSO plug-in on managed devices) or Company Portal (Android) provides SSO across Microsoft and MSAL apps.
- Passkey provider: users enable Authenticator as a passkey and AutoFill provider in the OS settings so apps and browsers on the phone can use the Authenticator passkey directly.
- Token protection: generally available for supported native apps on iOS/iPadOS 16+ with the Enterprise SSO plug-in.
- Unmanaged phones: pair passkeys with app protection policies rather than device compliance.
Remote Desktop, Azure Virtual Desktop and Windows 365
Remote Desktop can use Entra authentication instead of a password prompt, which lets passkeys and Windows Hello work at connection time.
- In the Remote Desktop client, tick Use a web account to sign in to the remote computer (RDP property
enablerdsaadauth:i:1). - The remote PC must be Entra joined or hybrid joined and reached by host name, not IP address. Windows 11, Windows 10 20H2+ and Server 2022 need the October 2022 cumulative update or later.
- For Azure Virtual Desktop and Windows 365, enable Entra single sign-on on the host pool or provisioning policy.
- Turn on WebAuthn redirection so passkeys and security keys work for browser sign-ins inside the session.
- Target Conditional Access at the app ID
a4a365df-50f1-4397-bc59-1a1564b8bb9cto require phishing-resistant sign-in for RDP. - Locking the remote session disconnects it, because the Windows lock screen can’t accept Entra tokens. Reconnect instead of unlocking.
Shared and frontline devices
| Device | Recommended sign-in | Notes |
|---|---|---|
| Shared Windows PC (managed) | FIDO2 security key | Intune: Use security keys for sign-in. Pair with shared PC mode or fast user switching. |
| Shared or kiosk PC (unmanaged) | Entra passkey on Windows, or security key | Web and app sign-in only; not Windows sign-in. |
| Shared Android / iOS | QR code + PIN, or NFC security key | Use shared device mode so sign-out clears all apps. QR + PIN is not phishing-resistant. |
| Personal phone, frontline worker | Authenticator passkey | Check local rules on requiring personal devices for work. |
Admins go first. A phished Global Administrator undoes everything else in this guide.
Design standard
- Separate accounts. Cloud-only admin accounts with no mailbox and no synced on-prem identity.
- Two attested security keys per admin, registered under the privileged passkey profile with an AAGUID allow list.
- PIM with authentication context. Require an authentication context (for example
c1) on role activation, and a Conditional Access policy that maps that context to the device-bound custom strength. - Privileged access workstations. Require a compliant device, ideally a dedicated PAW, for Tier-0 roles.
- Token protection for admin sessions on supported apps, starting in report-only mode.
- Shorter sessions. Sign-in frequency of a few hours for admin portals.
Emergency access accounts
- Create two cloud-only accounts on the
onmicrosoft.comdomain with permanent Global Administrator. - Register at least two FIDO2 keys per account; store them in separate physical locations.
- Exclude them from Conditional Access policies that could lock everyone out, and document why.
- Alert on every sign-in and test the accounts on a schedule (quarterly is common).
SigninLogs | where UserPrincipalName in~ ("bg-01@contoso.onmicrosoft.com", "bg-02@contoso.onmicrosoft.com") | project TimeGenerated, UserPrincipalName, ResultType, IPAddress, AppDisplayName, Location
Out of scope for passkeys
Service accounts and automation can’t use passkeys. Move them to managed identities, workload identity federation or certificate credentials, and avoid broad Conditional Access exclusions for them.
Federated domains (AD FS, Okta, Ping)
Passkeys work for users in federated domains: once registered, the passkey is validated by Entra ID directly, without a redirect to the federated identity provider. Other flows, such as password sign-in, still go to the IdP, so the user experience is mixed until you move to cloud authentication.
- Use staged rollout to move groups to password hash sync or pass-through authentication, then convert the domain to managed.
- Review the domain’s
federatedIdpMfaBehaviorsetting during the transition so MFA is enforced in the right place. - MFA performed at the federated IdP generally won’t satisfy a phishing-resistant authentication strength. Plan the cut-over before enforcing CA-PWL-03.
Third-party MFA
External authentication methods let Entra call providers such as Duo or Okta Verify for MFA. They count as MFA, not phishing-resistant MFA, so treat them as a migration bridge.
On-premises and legacy applications
| App type | Passwordless path |
|---|---|
| Kerberos / Integrated Windows Auth | WHfB with Cloud Kerberos Trust on the client; Entra application proxy or Private Access with Kerberos constrained delegation for remote users |
| Header-based web apps | Application proxy header-based SSO or a partner SSO gateway |
| SAML / OIDC apps (other IdPs) | Move the app’s federation to Entra ID so Conditional Access applies |
| VPN with RADIUS | Switch the VPN to SAML/OIDC with Entra, or replace with Global Secure Access |
| LDAP bind only | No passkey path. Modernize, or accept a scoped password exception with compensating controls |
| Linux servers (SSH) | Entra ID login for Linux VMs using certificate-based SSH |
Passkeys remove credential phishing. Attackers then move to whatever is left: weaker fallback methods, stolen tokens and the helpdesk.
| Attack | Why it can still work | Mitigation |
|---|---|---|
| Downgrade phishing | User still has a phishable method; the attacker’s proxy page asks for it instead | Require the phishing-resistant strength; remove SMS, voice and push from users who have passkeys |
| Token theft and replay | Session cookies or tokens are stolen after a valid sign-in | Token protection, compliant-device requirement, continuous access evaluation, short admin sessions |
| Device code phishing | User is tricked into entering a code for an attacker’s session | Block device code flow with the Conditional Access authentication flows condition; allow only named exceptions |
| Registration hijack | Attacker with a password registers their own passkey | CA-PWL-02 on security info registration; alert on new methods |
| Helpdesk social engineering | Caller convinces the helpdesk to issue a TAP | Verified identity checks, one-time short TAPs, logging and review |
| OAuth consent phishing | User grants a malicious app access; no sign-in needed | Restrict user consent; use the admin consent workflow |
| Provider account takeover | Synced passkeys follow the Apple, Google or password-manager account | Device-bound credentials for privileged roles and sensitive apps |
| Unapproved authenticators | Cheap or cloned keys with weak protection | Attestation and AAGUID allow lists in the privileged profile |
AuditLogs | where OperationName == "User registered security info" | extend User = tostring(TargetResources[0].userPrincipalName) | project TimeGenerated, User, ResultDescription, InitiatedBy
Pick the user population to see the recommended primary, roaming and fallback credentials, and the design notes that matter for that group.
Ten questions for a quick view of where a tenant stands. Tick each statement that is true today. Answers stay in this browser.
Six phases, each gated on the previous one. Tick items as you complete them; progress is saved in this browser only.
Three short emails for the onboarding wave. Replace the bracketed text, send from a recognized internal sender, and link to your own intranet page rather than to Microsoft pages users won’t trust in an email.
Subject: Signing in to [Company] is getting easier and safer Hi [First name], From [date], you'll sign in to your work account with a passkey instead of a password or text message code. A passkey uses your face, fingerprint or device PIN, and it can't be phished. What you need to do now: nothing yet. We'll send setup steps on [date]. Why we're doing this: most account break-ins start with a stolen password or code. Passkeys stop that. Questions? [Intranet link] or [helpdesk contact]. [IT team name]
Subject: Action needed: set up your passkey by [deadline] Hi [First name], Please set up your passkey before [deadline]. It takes about three minutes. 1. On your work computer, sign in as normal. When prompted, choose "Set up a passkey". 2. On your phone, install Microsoft Authenticator if you don't have it, then add a passkey when asked. 3. Try it: sign out and sign back in with your face, fingerprint or PIN. Step-by-step guide with screenshots: [intranet link] Stuck? Contact [helpdesk] and quote "passkey setup". IT will never ask for your passkey, PIN or a sign-in code by phone or email. [IT team name]
Subject: Reminder: passkey setup closes [deadline] Hi [First name], Our records show you haven't set up a passkey yet. After [deadline], you'll be asked to complete setup before you can sign in. Set it up now: [intranet link] (about three minutes) Need help or a loaner security key? [helpdesk contact] [IT team name]
Most user friction happens on day one and when a device is lost. Design both processes before the pilot.
Day one
- Identity is proofed by HR/manager process or Entra account recovery identity verification.
- Helpdesk or the joiner workflow issues a one-time TAP (short lifetime) through a secure channel.
- User signs in to Windows setup (Autopilot) or My Security Info with the TAP.
- User registers Windows Hello for Business, then a passkey in Authenticator as the roaming credential.
- The password, if one exists for directory sync, is never disclosed to the user.
Lost or replaced device
| Scenario | Self-service path | Assisted path |
|---|---|---|
| New laptop, phone still available | Sign in with Authenticator passkey via QR/Bluetooth, provision WHfB | Not needed |
| Phone lost, laptop available | Sign in with WHfB, register new Authenticator passkey, delete old one | Not needed |
| All credentials lost | Entra account recovery: government ID + selfie liveness check via verification partner, then register new credentials | Helpdesk verifies identity and issues TAP |
| Security key lost (admin) | Use second registered key | Revoke lost key; issue replacement via PAM-controlled process |
Helpdesk scripts
Common tasks with Microsoft Graph PowerShell. Run them only after the caller’s identity has been verified.
Connect-MgGraph -Scopes "UserAuthenticationMethod.ReadWrite.All", "User.RevokeSessions.All" $upn = "user@contoso.com" # List every registered method Get-MgUserAuthenticationMethod -UserId $upn | Select-Object Id, @{n="Type";e={$_.AdditionalProperties["@odata.type"]}} # List passkeys with model names, then remove a lost one Get-MgUserAuthenticationFido2Method -UserId $upn | Select-Object Id, DisplayName, Model, CreatedDateTime Remove-MgUserAuthenticationFido2Method -UserId $upn -Fido2AuthenticationMethodId "<id>" # Sign the user out everywhere after a lost device Revoke-MgUserSignInSession -UserId $upn
The helpdesk issuing a TAP becomes the new phishing target. Require verified identity (video call with ID, manager approval or Verified ID presentation) before any TAP is issued, and log every issuance.
Entra ID does not let you delete a user’s password outright, and hybrid identities still carry an AD password. In practice, you take the password out of daily use and stop disclosing it to users.
- Hide it on Windows. Intune setting Enable Passwordless Experience (Windows 11, Entra-joined) removes the password option from Windows sign-in and in-session prompts.
- Stop requiring it. System-preferred authentication skips the password prompt when a passkey or certificate is registered; phishing-resistant CA policies make it insufficient anyway.
- Make it unknown. Set long random passwords at provisioning, don’t disclose them, and rotate on a schedule for users who are fully passwordless.
- Shrink SSPR. Remove security questions (Microsoft removes them in Jan 2027) and SMS; recovery moves to passkeys, TAP and account recovery.
- Watch residual use. Report sign-ins still using password as the first factor, by app, and treat each as a remediation item.
Apps that only speak LDAP bind, NTLM or basic auth will keep passwords alive. Front them with Entra application proxy / private access with pre-authentication, or modernize them to SAML/OIDC.
| KPI | Source | Target |
|---|---|---|
| Users passwordless-capable | User registration details (isPasswordlessCapable) | ≥ 95% of in-scope users |
| Users with ≥ 2 phishing-resistant methods | User registration details (methodsRegistered) | ≥ 90% |
| Sign-ins using phishing-resistant auth | Sign-in logs, authentication details | ≥ 90% interactive sign-ins |
| Users with SMS/voice as only MFA | SMS/voice usage analyzer | 0 before 1 Feb 2027 |
| TAPs issued per week | Audit logs | Trending down after onboarding |
Connect-MgGraph -Scopes "AuditLog.Read.All" $r = Get-MgReportAuthenticationMethodUserRegistrationDetail -All $r | Group-Object IsPasswordlessCapable | Select-Object Name, Count $r | Where-Object { $_.MethodsRegistered -contains "mobilePhone" -and $_.MethodsRegistered.Count -eq 1 } | Select-Object UserPrincipalName # SMS-only users
SigninLogs | where TimeGenerated > ago(30d) and ResultType == 0 | mv-expand d = parse_json(AuthenticationDetails) | where tobool(d.succeeded) == true | summarize SignIns = dcount(CorrelationId) by Method = tostring(d.authenticationMethod) | order by SignIns desc
| Symptom | Likely cause | Check / fix |
|---|---|---|
| Passkey registration blocked: “authenticator not allowed” | Attestation enforced or AAGUID not in allow list for the user’s profile | Confirm profile membership and AAGUID; synced passkeys can’t satisfy attestation |
| Authenticator passkey QR flow hangs on PC | Bluetooth off or blocked on the PC | Enable Bluetooth; hybrid transport needs proximity |
| WHfB works but on-prem file shares prompt | No on-prem TGT from Cloud Kerberos Trust | Run dsregcmd /status and check OnPremTgt : YES; klist cloud_debug; confirm AzureADKerberos object and DC patching |
| Domain Admin can’t get on-prem SSO with WHfB | Privileged groups denied by AzureADKerberos replication policy | By design; use a separate admin account and PAW |
| User still asked for password | No phishing-resistant method registered, or app forces password (legacy/federated) | Check authentication methods on the user; review sign-in log authentication details |
| CA blocks user “does not meet authentication strength” | Registered method not included in the required strength | Sign-in log › Conditional Access tab shows the strength evaluated; register an included method |
| Entra passkey on Windows not offered | Windows Hello AAGUIDs on a block list, or attestation enforced in the user’s passkey profile | Review the user’s profile; Entra passkeys on Windows can’t satisfy attestation |
| Mac never prompts for Platform SSO registration | Company Portal too old, or the SSO extension profile isn’t assigned | Update Company Portal to 5.2404.0+; confirm the profile in Intune and that the user can register devices |
| RDP session disconnects when locked | Windows lock screen can’t accept Entra tokens | Expected behaviour with Entra RDP sign-in; reconnect to resume |
| Federated user sent to AD FS / Okta instead of passkey | User chose password, or no passkey is registered yet | Use Sign-in options and pick the passkey; plan the move to managed authentication |
| Token protection blocks a user in report-only review | Unsupported app, browser or device platform | Check sign-in logs for the app and platform; keep it in report-only for those until supported |
REM Look for AzureAdPrt : YES, CloudTgt : YES, OnPremTgt : YES dsregcmd /status REM Cloud Kerberos Trust state klist cloud_debug REM Reset WHfB for the signed-in user, then re-provision certutil -deletehellocontainer
Are synced passkeys secure enough for the enterprise?
They are phishing-resistant, so they stop credential phishing, the most common attack against sign-in. The residual risk moves to the security of the user’s Apple, Google or password-manager account. Allow them for general workforce access and require device-bound credentials for privileged roles and your most sensitive apps via custom authentication strengths.
Do we still need Windows Hello for Business if we have passkeys?
Yes, on managed Windows. WHfB signs the user in to Windows and issues the Primary Refresh Token, giving SSO to everything after. Entra passkeys on Windows are for unmanaged and shared PCs and cannot sign in to the device.
What happens to users who ignore the passkey nudge?
Until their SMS/voice retirement date, they can keep snoozing (unless you set a limit). After 1 Feb 2027 (1 Jul 2027 for Global Admins and external users), a user whose only method is Microsoft-provided SMS/voice must register a passkey to finish signing in.
Can we keep SMS for a regulated population?
Yes, via a customer-managed telecom provider from the Microsoft Security Store (from 30 Oct 2026). You contract and pay the carrier. Treat it as a time-limited exception with a documented end date.
How do guests and B2B users fit in?
Guests authenticate in their home tenant. Configure cross-tenant access settings to trust MFA (and device compliance) from partner tenants you trust, and require an authentication strength for guests on sensitive resources.
Which methods meet NIST AAL3 or federal phishing-resistant mandates?
Device-bound, hardware-backed authenticators: PIV/CAC via CBA, FIDO2 security keys (FIPS-validated where required) and platform authenticators such as WHfB. Synced passkeys are generally positioned at AAL2. Confirm against your agency or regulator’s current guidance.
Do passkeys work for users in federated domains?
Yes. After registration, Entra ID validates the passkey directly, with no redirect to AD FS, Okta or Ping. Password sign-in still goes to the federated IdP, so plan the move to managed authentication to get a consistent experience.
Do we need Entra ID P1?
To enforce phishing-resistant sign-in, yes: Conditional Access and authentication strengths are P1 features, and Microsoft’s MFA licensing page lists passkeys and Windows Hello for Business under P1 as well. Microsoft 365 E3, E5 and Business Premium include P1.
Can admins use passkeys for Remote Desktop?
Yes, when the remote PC is Entra joined or hybrid joined and the client uses Use a web account to sign in. Enable WebAuthn redirection for passkey use inside the session.
How many passkeys should a user have?
At least two phishing-resistant credentials on different devices, for example Windows Hello on the laptop and a passkey in Authenticator on the phone. Admins should hold two security keys.
- AAGUID
- Authenticator Attestation GUID: a 128-bit identifier for an authenticator make and model, used in allow and block lists.
- Attestation
- A signed statement from the authenticator proving its model and provenance, validated against FIDO metadata.
- Authentication strength
- A Conditional Access control that names the exact method combinations allowed for a resource.
- CTAP / WebAuthn
- The FIDO2 protocols between authenticator and client (CTAP) and between browser and relying party (WebAuthn).
- Device-bound passkey
- A passkey whose private key cannot leave the hardware it was created on.
- Hybrid transport
- Cross-device FIDO flow using a QR code plus Bluetooth proximity, e.g. phone passkey signing in on a PC.
- Passkey profile
- A group-targeted set of FIDO2 rules: passkey type, attestation and key restrictions.
- PRT
- Primary Refresh Token: the device-bound Entra token issued at Windows/macOS sign-in that drives SSO.
- Relying party ID
- The domain a passkey is scoped to; the browser enforces the match with the page origin.
- Synced passkey
- A passkey replicated across a user’s devices by a credential manager.
- System-preferred authentication
- Entra offering the strongest registered method first, for both first factor and MFA.
- TAP
- Temporary Access Pass: a time-limited code used to bootstrap or recover passwordless credentials.
- Authentication context
- A label (such as c1) that apps and PIM can request, which Conditional Access maps to a stronger requirement.
- External authentication method
- A third-party MFA provider called by Entra ID. Counts as MFA, not phishing-resistant MFA.
- Platform SSO
- macOS feature that registers the Mac with Entra ID and signs the user in with a Secure Enclave key.
- Token protection
- Conditional Access control that accepts only sign-in tokens bound to the device they were issued to.
Entra changes monthly. Re-verify dates and limits against these pages at each review.
- Passkeys by default and retirement of Microsoft-provided SMS and voice, Microsoft Learn
- Passkeys are the default authentication method in Entra ID, Microsoft Security Blog, Jul 2026
- World Passkey Day: advancing passwordless authentication, Microsoft Security Blog, May 2026
- MC1221452: GA of passkey profiles and migration, Message Center archive
- MC1282568: GA of Microsoft Entra passkeys on Windows, Message Center archive
- Plan a phishing-resistant passwordless deployment, Microsoft Learn
- Run a registration campaign, Microsoft Learn
- Configure a Temporary Access Pass, Microsoft Learn
- Enable Microsoft Entra passkey on Windows, Microsoft Learn
- Account recovery overview, Microsoft Learn
- Passwordless is now default, Big Hat Group, May 2026
- entra-sms-voice-usage-analyzer, GitHub
- MFA versions and licensing, Microsoft Learn
- macOS Platform SSO overview, Microsoft Learn
- Token protection in Conditional Access, Microsoft Learn
- Remote Desktop SSO with Entra authentication, Microsoft Learn
- Passkeys (FIDO2) authentication method, Microsoft Learn
- Passkey sign-in for federated users (docs change), GitHub